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1. Introduction 
One general consequence of enlargement of the European Union (EU) will be the increased 
difficulty of legislating on taxation, since in this field unanimity is generally required in the 
Council (European Parliament, 2003: 11). This problem was addressed at the 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) in 2000, but the resulting Treaty of Nice has not made 
any significant amendments to the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) with 
regards to decision-making on taxation. 
The European Convention, the outcomes of which will be decided upon in October 2003, has 
-in its draft constitution- introduced the possibility of qualified majority voting in issues of 
administrative cooperation and tax fraud and evasion. In all other tax matters the status quo 
has been retained (i.e. unanimity as the decision rule within Council and consultation as the 
legislative procedure), even though at the last plenary session of the Convention regret was 
voiced by various Convention members with the fact that it had not been possible to reach 
consensus on extending qualified majority voting (QMV) to decisions concerning taxation
1
. 
 
In this paper the (legal) instruments the EU has in the field of tax co-ordination are discussed, 
as well as the decision-making procedures that are involved. The main question the paper 
addresses is: What impact will (proposals for) institutional reform have on the legal 
framework for EU tax co-ordination, in an enlarged EU? 
In section 2 we will discuss in a more general way the instruments for tax co-ordination as 
they are currently available in the EU. Section 3 deals with the current decision-making 
framework regarding legislation on taxation. In section 4 the actual use of the decision-
making procedures in the period 1976-2003 is portrayed. Various proposals for reform of 
legislative procedures will then be discussed, with an emphasis on the 2000 IGC (section 5) 
and the European Convention (section 6). Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2. Instruments for tax co-ordination 
So far, tax co-ordination issues in the EU have been tackled in three ways (Groenendijk, 
1999: 65). 
First, outside the EU framework (and often within the framework of the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD) member states have used tax treaties for 
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bilateral or multilateral
2
 co-ordination, especially for preventing double taxation. The 
obligation for EU member states to prevent double taxation is laid down in the TEC (article 
293). 
Secondly, there is EU-legislation directed at tax harmonisation, on different levels: 
- the first level consists of the EU treaties (primary law); 
- the second level consists of EU directives and regulations (secondary law); 
- the third level: decisions of Council and Commission based on secondary law (tertiairy 
law); 
- the fourth level: case law by the Court of Justice. Cases can be brought to the Court of 
Justice by both citizens/companies and EU institutions (including the Commission: 
infringement procedures). 
Thirdly, there is the non-legal approach to tax co-ordination, involving multilateral 
agreements between member states (like the Code of Conduct on business taxation), and all 
kinds of guidelines, recommendations and communications, aiming at developing processes 
of peer review and pressure. 
 
Table 1 Instruments for EU tax co-ordination 
 Inside EU framework Outside EU framework 
Binding 
“Hard” 
Legislative approach 
Council (and EP) directives 
Council (and EP) regulations 
Council decisions 
Commission decisions 
Infringement procedures/case law 
Bilateral and multilateral tax 
treaties 
Non-binding 
“Soft” 
Non-legislative approach 
Open method of co-ordination 
Codes of Conduct 
Council policy guidelines 
Commission recommendations 
Commission guidelines 
Commission interpretative notices 
Commission communications 
- 
 
The legislative approach is still dominant. The Commission, in a review of the instruments at 
its disposal to reach tax policy objectives, has argued that the main problem within that 
approach is the lack of progress, as the pace at which proposals for directives in the tax field 
are agreed is disappointingly slow, which is caused by a combination of insufficient political 
will and the unanimity rule (European Commission, 2001: 21-22). Moreover, where the TEC 
does give clear legal competence to the Union regarding indirect taxation (especially article 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1 See Summary Report on the plenary session (Brussels, 9 and 10 July 2003, CONV 853/03). 
2 The composition of the multilateral group of countries sometimes coincides with the EU-15, see for instance 
90/436/EEG. 
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93 TEC), in the case of direct taxation the Treaty has provided hardly any legal base at all. It 
has been necessary to justify legislative action in this field as being in pursuit of more general 
objectives: the free movement of workers (article 39 TEC), freedom of establishment (article 
43 TEC), free movement of capital (article 56 TEC), the functioning of the common market 
(article 94 TEC), and preventing distortions of competition (article 96 TEC)
3
. In that regard 
the development of case law has become rather important. Most often individual litigants 
(taxpayers) have brought cases to the European Court of Justice; the Commission itself has 
been responsible for only a limited number of infringement proceedings against member 
states. Especially in the field of (direct) taxation a lot is left to chance because the 
Commission only reacts to cases taken to the European Court of Justice by taxpayers. 
The legal approach thus suffers from a general problem concerning progress, but also from a 
problem of asymmetry: it „favours‟ indirect taxation. 
As far as the legislative approach is concerned the Commission proposes the following 
improvements: 
- a move to qualified majority voting at least for certain tax issues; 
- an increased use of the implementing powers conferred on the Commission by the 
Council, in order to adapt and modernise legislation more quickly; 
- a more active, and especially more pro-active strategy of the Commission (as guardian of 
the Treaties) in the field of tax infringements by member states (legal action). 
 
The use of non-legislative approaches or soft legislation may be an additional means of 
making progress in the tax field. The advantage of this approach is that the asymmetry-
problem can be overcome (European Commission, 2001: 23-24). The downside of this 
approach is that it is very resource-intensive and that the outcomes are not enforceable, 
neither in legal terms nor in political terms
4
. As such the future of for instance the Code of 
Conduct on business taxation is rather uncertain (Meussen, 2002: 158)
5
. Moreover, the role of 
European Parliament in this approach has been rather limited
6
. 
 
                                                        
3 Article 308 TEC (which gives a legal net to the Council in case the Treaty does not provide the necessary 
powers) is sometimes also mentioned as a possible legal basis for harmonisation in the field of direct taxation. 
4 The thing with gentlemens‟ agreements like the Code of Conduct is that those participating are not always 
gentlemen. 
5 Partly due to the package-deal character of the Code of Conduct on business taxation and other proposals in the 
field of direct taxation, on which final agreement has recently been reached. 
6 For a more extensive review of the use of soft law (with an application to competition policy) see Cosma en 
Whish (2003). 
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The actual use of this method has so far been limited to: 
- the Code of Conduct on business taxation, of 1 December 1997, and its follow-up; 
- two Commission recommendations: one on the taxation of small and medium-sized 
enterprises and one on taxation of certain items of income received by non-residents in a 
member state other than in which they are resident
7
; 
- a large number of Commission reports and communications. 
The latter category is dealt with in more detail in table 2
8
. 
 
Table 2 Commission reports, communications et cetera, 1976-2003 
A. Period Number 
1976-1980 6 
1981-1985 15 
1986-1990 18 
1991-1995 17 
1996-2000 28 
2000-2003 12 
Total 96 
  
B. Type Number 
Working paper 4 
Report 44 
Communication 47 
Memorandum 1 
Total 96 
  
C. Subject Number 
Taxation in general 13 
Indirect taxation, general resp. total 5 71 
VAT 40  
Excises 7  
Fuel taxes/excises 8  
Vehicle tax 2  
Tobacco tax/excises 5  
Energy products 3  
Environmental taxes 1  
Direct taxation, general, resp. total 1 12 
Company taxation and/or savings income tax 10  
Personal income tax 1  
Total 96 
 
From table 2 it becomes quite clear that the use of reports and communications is indeed on 
the increase since 1996. Reports (that in principle do not contain policy positions by the 
                                                        
7 Of 25 May 1994 (C (1994) 1305 respectively 21 December 1993 (C (1993) 3702). 
8 The data in this section and the following sections are gathered using the Prelex-database on inter-institutional 
procedures, kept by the Secretariat-General of the European Commission. It contains all relevant (legislative and 
non-legislative) documents used in decision-making within the EU, since 1976. The database has been searched 
for data on tax and excise issues. The decision-making processes regarding the system of own resources, as well 
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Commission) and communications (which do) are well-balanced. The majority of reports and 
recommendations is on indirect taxation, which means that up till now in the actual use of the 
non-legal approach there has been quite some asymmetry as well. 
 
Enhanced cooperation 
The Amsterdam and Nice Treaties have introduced the possibility of closer cooperation 
between subgroups of like-minded member states (articles 11 and 11a TEC).  The actual use 
of enhanced cooperation in the tax field can be problematic however. The policy areas 
concerned have to be self-contained so that member states cannot pick and choose between 
policies as best suits them. Enhanced cooperation must not undermine the internal market, 
constitute a barrier to or discrimination of trade, distort the conditions of competition, or 
affect the competences, rights and obligations of the non-participating member states 
(European Commission, 2001: 24). Hence, it is clear that the areas of VAT and excise duties 
are by and large off-limit for enhanced cooperation, as any deviation from the current 
harmonised EU wide system will bring about distortions. Often the areas of environmental 
and energy taxation are mentioned as examples where enhanced cooperation could be useful, 
as well as business taxation. The problem with enhanced cooperation in these fields is that it 
is likely that those member states that do not wish to participate will do so because they feel 
their tax systems in these specific areas should be more „tax-payer friendly‟ than participating 
members. In that respect it is not likely, contrary to what Bradley has argued more generally 
(mentioned in and followed by Meussen, 2002: 159), that in the tax field the „threat‟ of 
enhanced co-operation can be used to let member states make compromises within the 
ordinary EU-wide (unanimity-ruled) decision-making processes. Luxembourg, for instance, 
would be have been over the moon if the other 14 member states had opted for enhanced 
cooperation concerning savings income taxation. 
 
In our view: 
- the alternative instrument of increased legal action against member states by the 
Commission is at best an additional one; 
- there is only very limited experience with the use of recommendations by the Commission 
and the impact these recommendations may have. It is not very likely however that 
                                                                                                                                                                             
as tax matters relating to customs duties, have been excluded from the gathering of data for this paper. 
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member states will take Commission recommendations to heart in cases where these 
recommendations are at odds with their own interests and position; 
- codes of conduct suffer from weak enforceability, which to a certain extent has got to do 
with the same problem the legal approach suffers from, i.e. the impossibility to take 
measures against the will of a member state; 
- enhanced cooperation has only limited use in the field of taxation. 
In the remainder of this paper we will therefore focus on the legal approach, more specifically 
on the various legislative procedures and the issue of QMV-unanimity, because that is in our 
view the most relevant issue. 
 
 
3. The current decision-making framework regarding taxation 
The Treaties currently provide for more than 22 different decision-making procedures for the 
adoption of legislative acts
9
. These procedures can be classified taking into account the voting 
system used by the Council, the involvement of Parliament and the consultation of institutions 
or other bodies. 
 
Table 3 Current legislative procedures within the Union 
Decision rule 
(Council) 
Role of EP Relevance to taxation Article TEC 
QMV Codecision Harmonisation measures relating to the internal 
market 
Customs cooperation 
Fraud affecting the financial interests of the 
Community 
95(1) 
 
135 (new) 
280(4) 
QMV Simple consultation - - 
QMV Cooperation - - 
QMV Assent - - 
QMV No participation Fixing of Common Customs Tariff Duties 
Approval of measures concerning charges other 
than turnover taxes, excise duties and other forms 
of indirect taxation 
Adoption of directives to eliminate distortion 
within the common market 
26 
92 
 
 
96 second part 
Unanimity Codecision   
Unanimity Simple consultation Harmonisation of indirect taxation 
Approximation of laws 
Provisions of a fiscal nature (environment) 
93 
94 
175(2) 
Unanimity Assent - - 
Unanimity No participation - - 
 
                                                        
9 For a description see annex I of Legislative procedures (including the budgetary procedure) – current situation 
(Praesidium Convention, Brussels, 24 July 2002, CONV 216/02). 
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Basically, there are four procedures
10
 that are relevant to taxation
11
. 
First, article 93 TEC deals with the harmonisation of indirect taxes. In this procedure, the 
Commission comes up with a proposal, European Parliament and the Economic and Social 
Committee are consulted
12
, and the Council has to decide by unanimity. The output of this 
procedure is –in almost all cases- Council directives. Article 93 states that provisions for 
harmonisation of indirect taxes are adopted “to the extent that such harmonisation is 
necessary to ensure the establishment and the functioning of the internal market”. 
Secondly, article 94 TEC deals with approximation of laws in general, and has been used in 
the field of direct taxation, as there is no article in the TEC that deals explicitly with direct 
taxation (as article 93 does with indirect taxation). Again, the Commission comes up with a 
proposal, European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee are consulted, and 
the Council has to decide by unanimity, resulting in directives. Article 94 deals with 
“approximation of such laws, regulations or administrative provisions of the Member States 
as directly affect the establishment or functioning of the internal market”. This wording 
(directly affect the functioning of the internal market) constitutes a much stricter criterion for 
EU-intervention than that of article 93 (necessary to ensure the functioning of the internal 
market). Sometimes direct taxation has a clear impact on the four freedoms and/or the right of 
establishment for individuals and companies, but in most cases there is no real need for 
harmonisation or alignment. As far as indirect taxation is concerned: the internal market 
simply operates most effectively when there is complete harmonisation of national tax 
legislation. 
Thirdly, article 175(2) TEC (introduced by the Single European Act) deals with the measures 
to achieve the environmental objectives of the EU. The Council, acting unanimously on a 
proposal from the Commission and after consulting Parliament and the Economic and Social 
Committee, can adopt (amongst other things) provisions of a fiscal nature. Article 175(2) 
leaves open which type of taxation is involved
13
. 
Lastly, article 95 TEC has been used to deal with administrative matters concerning taxation. 
Article 95 is similar to article 94 as both articles refer to the approximation of laws et cetera in 
                                                        
10 Of course there are other articles of the TEC that are relevant to taxation as well like article 90 TEC (which 
prohibits any tax discrimination which would, directly or indirectly, give an advantage to national products over 
products from other Member States). 
11 Article 96 has never been applied. See Meussen (2002: 158) about the possible usefulness of this article to 
fight harmful tax competition. 
12 This is the mandatory consultation, in some cases the Committee of the Regions may also be consulted, on an 
optional basis. 
13 See Borgsmidt (1999) for a more extensive review of ecotaxes in the framework of EU law. 
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general. Article 94 deals with directives (and follows the consultation procedure, and requires 
unanimity in the Council), article 95 deals with “provisions” which can be directives, 
regulations as well as decisions. Article 95 follows the co-decision procedure, in which 
Council and Parliament participate as co-legislators, on an equal footing
14
, and Council has to 
decide by qualified majority. Paragraph 2 of article 95 explicitly rules out fiscal provisions 
(they have to be dealt with by article 93 or article 94) but in practice some administrative 
matters regarding taxation have been dealt with using this article. 
 
 
4. The actual use of the various procedures, 1976-2003 
Table 4 shows the legislative output in the tax field, since 1976. The bulk of the output is 
made up of Council Directives and Council Decisions. It also becomes clear that with Council 
Directives, the withdrawal of its proposals by the Commission is quite common. About a 
quarter of such proposals has to be withdrawn. In the case of Council Decisions on the other 
hand, withdrawal is exceptional. 
 
Table 4 Legislative output based on Commission proposals (n=291), in the field of  taxation, 1976-200315 
Type of intended output State of affairs 
 In force In 
progress 
Withdrawn Partly in 
force, partly 
withdrawn 
Not clear Total 
Council Directives 68 18 33 2 - 121 
Council Regulations 10 - 4 - - 14 
Council Resolutions - - 1 - - 1 
Council Decisions 137 2 3 - 4 146 
EP and Council Directives 1 1 1 - - 3 
EP and Council 
Regulations 
2 2 - - - 4 
EP and Council Decisions 2 - - - - 2 
All 220 23 42 2 4 291 
 
In table 5 the different procedures are listed, as well as the legal basis of the legislation in 
primary or secondary law. The table holds no big surprises. It is clear that article 93 TEC is 
the most relevant one as far as primary law is concerned, often in combination with other 
TEC articles. Table 4 does not explicitly list article 175 (2) TEC on environmental taxation: 
up till now that article has not been used. 
                                                        
14 With mandatory consultation of the Economic and Social Committee. 
15 Excluding Commission decisions. 
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In all cases where secondary law provides the legal basis, we are dealing with Council 
Decisions (based on Directives) that do not involve European Parliament. 
 
Table 5 Legal basis and procedure, Commission  proposals for EU tax legislation (n=291), 1976-2003 
Procedure TEC Art. 
93 (99 old) 
TEC Art. 
94 (100 
old) 
TEC 
Art.95 
(100 A-D 
old) 
TEC Mix 
of arts. 93-
95 and/or 
other TEC 
articles 
Secon-
dary law 
Not clear Total 
Not clear 1 - 1 - - 1 3 
None - - - 4 139 2 145 
Consultation 63 15 - 38 6 9 131 
Codecision - - 7 3 - - 10 
Cooperation - - 1 1 - - 2 
All 64 15 9 46 145 12 291 
 
Table 6 shows how the legislative output relates to the type of taxation involved. Table 7 does 
the same thing for the different legal procedures. 
 
Table 6 Legislative output, by type of taxation, based on Commission proposals (n=291) 
Output Indirect taxes  Direct taxes  General  Total 
Council Directives VAT and/or excises  
Tobacco 
Fuel 
Alcohol 
Vehicle 
Carbon/energy 
71 
16 
4 
4 
2 
2 
Company tax 
Capital tax 
Savings income 
Income tax 
Interest 
Securities 
Direct taxes, 
general 
11 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
 
 2 121 
Council Regulations VAT and/or excises 
Fuel 
5 
1 
Community tax 8  - 14 
Council Resolutions  -  -  1 1 
Council Decisions VAT and/or excises 
Fuel 
Alcohol 
92 
50 
3 
 
   1 146 
EP and Council 
Directives 
VAT and/or excises 2  -  1 3 
EP and Council 
Regulations 
VAT and/or excises 3  -  1 4 
EP and Council 
Decisions 
VAT and/or excises  2  -  - 2 
All  257  28  6 291 
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Table 7 Legislative procedures, by type of taxation, based on Commission proposals (n=291) 
Procedure Indirect taxes  Direct taxes  General  Total 
Not clear VAT and/or excises 2 Company tax 1  - 3 
None VAT and/or excises  
Fuel 
90 
49 
Community tax 4  2 145 
Consultation VAT and/or excises  
Tobacco 
Fuel 
Alcohol 
Vehicle 
Carbon/energy 
74 
16 
6 
7 
2 
2 
Company tax 
Capital tax 
Savings income 
Income tax 
Interest 
Securities 
Direct taxes, 
general 
Community tax 
10 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
 
4 
 1 131 
Codecision VAT and/or excises 7    3 10 
Cooperation VAT and/or excises 2     2 
All  257  28  6 291 
 
It is clear that EU legislation on taxation is indeed a matter of indirect taxes, supplemented 
with some legislation on company taxation. As far as the legislative procedure is concerned: 
roughly it is either a matter of consulting Parliament, or passing over Parliament. There are a 
few legal acts that have been adopted using the co-decision procedure, which are all on VAT 
and/or excise administrative matters (like the establishment of the Fiscalis programme, which 
intents to improve the operation of the indirect tax systems in the internal market, including 
communication and information exchange systems, and multilateral controls). 
 
How successful has the Commission been in its efforts to get legislation adopted? In the 
previous sections we referred to Commission documents in which the lack of political will of 
member states to legislate on taxation was criticised, as well as the length of the procedures 
involved. 
Table 8 shows what has happened with Commission proposals. First, it follows from that 
table that there is an increasing legislative activity on the part of the Commission in the field 
of taxation. Furthermore, up till 2000 the adoption rate (number of proposals eventually 
adopted/number of proposals) has steadily increased. By and large, the Commission has 
increased its (effective) productivity in this field. 
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Table 8 Commission legislative proposals ,legislation adopted by Council,  by period (1976-2003) 
Period Number of 
proposals 
In force 
(adoption 
rate) 
In progress Withdrawn Partly 
withdrawn, 
partly in 
force  
Not clear 
 1976-1980 30 19 (0.63) 1 10 - - 
1981-1985 35 19 (0.54) 1 13 2 - 
1986-1990 36 25 (0.69) - 11 - - 
1991-1995 62 53 (0.85) 2 6 - 1 
1996-2000 88 76 (0.86) 7 2 - 3 
2000-2003 40 27 (0.68) 13 - - - 
Total 291 219 (0.75) 24 42 2 4 
 
How about the lengthy procedures? Actually, the problem seems to have diminished 
considerably. In the early days of European integration it would take on average more than 
three years to get tax legislation adopted. Nowadays, it takes about half a year. Of course, it 
could well be that the Commission (which has agenda-setting power in EU legislation) has 
limited itself more and more to the painless issues, and has steered well away from everlasting 
procedures. 
 
Table 9  Length of decision-making procedure, legislation adopted by Council,  by period (1976-2003) 
Period Adopted 
proposals 
Difference between date of proposal and date of adoption (in days) 
 1976-1980 19 1221 
1981-1985 19 636 
1986-1990 25 457 
1991-1995 53 192 
1996-2000 76 198 
2000-2003 27 171 
Total 219 All procedures: 349 days 
 
Codecision /QMV: 565 days (n=5) 
Consultation/unanimity: 674 days (n=81) 
 
The average length of the legislative procedures of 349 days does of course involve both 
legislation for Council decisions (which are fairly simple and short), as well as the more 
intensive procedures (consultation and codecision) for Council directives. 
Of the 291 procedures that have been analysed, ten followed the codecision procedure of 
article 95 TEC, in which Council can decide by QMV. Five of these ten procedures have 
resulted in adoption by the Council (one proposal was withdrawn, four procedures are still in 
progress). The average length of these five finished procedures was 565 days. For finished 
legislation under the consultation procedure with unanimity as the voting rule in Council, the 
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average length is 674 days (n=81 procedures). That means that QMV does speed up the 
decision-making process, in particular when we take into account that the more intensive 
involvement of Parliament in the codecision procedure as such, compared to its involvement 
in the consultation procedure, is bound to lengthen the process. 
In the next two sections we will have a closer look at the issue of QMV in EU tax legislation. 
 
 
5. Previously on the same show ………the IGC of 2002 and the Treaty of Nice 
In the run up to the 2000 IGC the Commission came up with a communication on the issue of 
QMV in the taxation and social security fields (European Commission, 2000). The 
Commission concluded that (in the tax field) QMV should be introduced for: 
- adoption of coordinating provisions intended to remove a direct obstacle to the exercise of 
the four freedoms, and in particular to prevent discrimination and double taxation; 
- measures which modernise and simplify existing Community rules in the indirect tax area 
in order to eliminate distortions of competition; 
- measures which ensure a uniform application of existing indirect taxation rules and 
guarantee the simple and transparent application of such rules
16
; 
- taxation measures which have as their principal objective the protection of the 
environment and have a direct and significant effect on the environment; 
- adoption of provisions directly governing the levying of tax and aimed at preventing 
fraud, evasion or tax avoidance in order to eliminate cases of double non-taxation in 
cross-border situations and to prevent circumvention of existing provisions, particularly in 
the VAT field. 
According to the Commission, the use of QMV in these areas should be accompanied by the 
use of the codecision procedure. Furthermore the Commission proposed to include in article 
93 TEC (consultation procedure, unanimity) both indirect and direct taxation, so as to give an 
explicit legal basis to direct tax legislation. 
All the IGC delegations, even the most ambitious, wanted unanimity to remain the rule in 
matters of taxation. At the same time the vast majority of the members was in favour of the 
use of QMV in taxation matters concerning cross-border issues: situations where separate tax 
systems are a barrier to the free movement of persons, goods, businesses and services (double 
                                                        
16 The idea here is to describe in more detail which question this covers in a protocol annexed to the Treaty (see 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/igc2000/geninfo/fact-sheets/fact-sheet2/index_en.htm (8-12-2000). 
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taxation, VAT, cross-border fraud, eco-taxes). There was consensus that in no case could tax 
rates be harmonised by QMV. 
Compared to the consensus at the IGC that some change should take place, the outcome of 
Nice was disappointing, as the Nice Treaty does not make any change to the TEC in the field 
of taxation. Not surprisingly, in the years after 2000, the issue remained subject of discussion. 
The Commission, in its 2001 communication on the priorities for tax policy in the EU, 
repeated its preference for the introduction of QMV in selected tax matters (European 
Commission, 2001: 21). 
 
The parliamentary Della Vedova Report (in reaction to Commission communications on tax 
policy of 2001
17), which resulted in Parliament‟s resolution on general tax policy of March 
2002, argued that the subsidiarity principle should guide EU taxation policy, that decisions on 
levels of tax should remain within the exclusive competence of the member States, and that 
the principle of unanimity should be retained whenever tax bases or rates of taxation are at 
issue. The report however supported a limited extension of qualified majority voting in 
Council for decisions concerning mutual assistance and co-operation between tax authorities. 
In any case, Parliament should be given co-decision powers in the taxation area (European 
Parliament, 2003: 15/16). According to Parliament (European Parliament, 2003: 11) the 
Treaty should be changed to allow the use of weighted majority voting in certain areas of 
taxation (for example on mutual assistance between tax authorities) and/or greater use should 
be made of “enhanced co-operation” which allows a subgroup of Member States to proceed 
with a policy opposed by a blocking minority. 
 
There is a considerable difference between the positions of the Commission and Parliament. 
Both agree on the use of QMV in administrative matters (in line with the practice of using 
article 95 TEC, see the previous sections), but the Commission explicitly comes up with a 
number of matters concerning the content of taxation (like environmental taxation, 
modernisation of indirect taxation), which it thinks should also be dealt with by QMV. As we 
will see such a dividing line also runs through the European Convention. 
                                                        
17 On future priorities in general tax policy (COM 2001(260)) and on a consolidated corporate tax base (COM 
2001(582)). 
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6. Taxation and the European Convention 
 
The Nice and Laeken Declarations on the future of the Union have asked the European 
Convention to look into the question of establishing a more precise delimitation of 
competence between the European Union and the Member States and of checking compliance 
with that delimitation. Furthermore, the Convention was supposed to deal with reform of the 
legislative procedures. The high number of these procedures, the fact that sometimes different 
procedures are applied in areas which are closely related (or appear in the same provision of 
the Treaty), their complexity, and the need to maintain and/or improve their efficiency in an 
enlarged Europe, are all arguments for an effort to rationalise and simplify legislative 
procedures
18
. 
 
The Working Group on Economic Governance dealt with monetary policy, economic policy 
and institutional issues. By and large it argued in favour of maintaining the current structure 
whereby exclusive competence for monetary policy lies with the Union (exercised by the 
ECB) and competence for economic policy lies with the Member States
19
. However, it felt 
that there is a need for improved coordination between the economic policies of the Member 
States. 
As far as taxation is concerned, the Working Group argued in favour of maintaining the 
competences of the Union as set out in Articles 93, 94 and 175 TEC, as it was divided on 
change. A majority of the Working Group recommended changes in order to facilitate 
progress in the area of fiscal policy, in terms of sufficient approximation of rates, minimum 
standards and tax bases in the areas of indirect and company taxation, all to ensure that the 
proper functioning of the single market is not affected by harmful tax competition or serious 
trade distortion. The objective of these changes should not be the establishment of unified 
taxes, nor should it concern the areas of personal and property taxation. According to this 
majority the Constitution should
20
: 
                                                        
18 See Legislative procedures (including the budgetary procedure) – current situation (Praesidium Convention, 
Brussels, 24 July 2002, COVNV 216/02, point 10). 
19 See Final report of Working Group VI on Economic Governance (Brussels, 21 October 2002, CONV 357/02, 
p. 2). 
20 Idem, p. 6/7. 
 15 
1. provide for an exhaustive list of specific types of measure where QMV should apply21, for 
practical and logical reasons linked to the proper functioning of the internal market, and in 
areas affecting directly the fundamental freedoms, or where such measures might be 
essential for sustainable development
22
; 
2. indicate explicitly that these specific measures adopted by QMV cannot (directly or 
indirectly) affect the substance of other areas of tax policy, in particular personal and 
property taxation. 
Some Working Group members stated that they were not able to accept any move towards 
QMV and preferred to maintain unanimity in all decisions on taxation. During the plenary 
debate of the European Convention on the Final report of Working Group VI this discord was 
dutifully reported by Working Group Chairman Hänsch but not further discussed. The area of 
taxation was “a particularly sensitive one”23. 
 
Following up on the preliminary draft of a new EU Treaty by the Convention Praesidium of 
October 2002, the working party of legal experts started working on the idea of a single 
constitutional treaty replacing the Treaty establishing the European Community and the 
Treaty on European Union. It proposed to leave articles 90 to 93 TEC unchanged, as well as 
articles 96 and 97 TEC. Changes were proposed to articles 94 and 95 TEC. The Draft 
Constitution of May 2003 introduced the possibility of QMV for measures relating to 
administrative cooperation or to combating tax fraud, in the field of indirect taxation and in 
the field of company taxation (see annex). According to the Convention Praesidium, the 
objective of the changes has been to respond to calls from the Working Group on Economic 
Governance for a move to QMV on tax issues, whilst recognising the sensitivity of this issue 
as expressed by a number of Convention members both in and out the Working Group
24
. The 
modification defines these areas where QMV should be applied, and introduces a mechanism 
by which the Council can only decide on a proposed measure if it has previously confirmed, 
by unanimity, that it does fall within the scope of those areas to which QMV applies. 
                                                        
21 Under the co-decision procedure. 
22 The exhaustive list can thus be thought  to be concerned with indirect taxation (including „green taxes‟) and 
company taxation. 
23 Summary report of the plenary session of 7 and 8 November 2002 (Brussels, 13 November 2002, CONV 
4000/02, p. 3.)  
24 See Drafts sections of Part Three with Comments (Praesidium Convention, Brussels, 27 May 2003, CONV 
727/03) 
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Going by articles III-62 and III-63 (see annex) QMV is possible when the following 
conditions are (cumulatively) met: 
a) measures in the field of indirect taxation or company taxation; 
b) which are necessary to ensure the functioning of the internal market and to avoid 
distortions of competition; 
c) which relate to administrative cooperation or to combating tax fraud and tax evasion; 
d) the latter to be decided upon unanimously by Council, on a proposal from the 
Commission. 
Both article III-62 and III-63 state that the consultation procedure is to be used, in all cases 
(i.e. also when QMV is used as the decision rule in Council). 
 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
If we compare the Draft Constitution‟s provisions with the current legislative framework, the 
following differences stand out: 
- tax legislation on company taxation is given an explicit legal basis, which is however 
limited to cases where all previously mentioned conditions are met. There is still no 
explicit basis in the Treaty for EU tax legislation on direct taxation in general; 
- Parliament is sidelined, as it is currently involved as a co-legislator in article 95 TEC-
procedures, and the Convention has opted for consultation in all tax matters; 
- the current application of article 95 TEC does not require prior unanimity of the Council. 
It can then be argued, as was done by several Convention members
25
, that in some respects 
the Convention outcomes are a retrograde step compared with existing provisions. Others 
have argued that the proposed changes leave the door wide open to the use of QMV on issues 
of tax bases and tax rates, as tax administration cannot be isolated from wider tax policy. 
Allowing for QMV in an apparently limited area could affect the right of member states to 
control much of their own tax policy
26
. The glass is either half full or half empty! 
 
-0-0-0-0-0- 
 
                                                        
25 See Summary Report of the plenary session, Brussels 30 and 31 May 2003 (Brussels, 16 June 2003, CONV 
783/03), and the letter by members Amato, Brok and Duff (Brussels, 22 July 2003, CONV 829/03). 
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Annex: relevant articles from the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (European 
Convention, 18 July 2003) 
 
Article III-59 (article 90 TEC, unchanged) 
No Member State shall impose, directly or indirectly, on the products of other Member States any 
internal taxation of any kind in excess of that imposed directly or indirectly on similar domestic 
products. Furthermore, no Member State shall impose on the products of other Member States any 
internal taxation of such a nature as to afford indirect protection to other products. 
Article III-60 (article 91 TEC, rephrased) 
Where products are exported by a Member State to the territory of another Member State, any 
repayment of internal taxation shall not exceed the internal taxation imposed on them whether 
directly or indirectly. 
Article III-61 (article 92 TEC, rephrased) 
In the case of charges other than turnover taxes, excise duties and other forms of indirect taxation, 
remissions and repayments in respect of exports to other Member States may not be granted and 
countervailing charges in respect of imports from Member States may not be imposed unless the 
provisions contemplated have been previously approved for a limited period by a European 
decision adopted by the Council of Ministers on a proposal from the Commission. 
Article III-62 (article 93 TEC, changed) 
1. A European law or framework law of the Council of Ministers shall lay down measures for the 
harmonisation of legislation concerning turnover taxes, excise duties and other forms of indirect 
taxation provided that such harmonisation is necessary for the functioning of the internal market 
and to avoid distortion of competition. The Council of Ministers shall act unanimously after 
consulting the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee. 
2. Where the Council of Ministers, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, finds 
that the measures referred to in paragraph 1 relate to administrative cooperation or to combating tax 
fraud and tax evasion, it shall act, notwithstanding paragraph 1, by a qualified majority when 
adopting the European law or framework law adopting these measures. 
Article III-63 (new) 
Where the Council of Ministers, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, finds that 
measures on company taxation relate to administrative cooperation or combating tax fraud and tax 
evasion, it shall adopt, by a qualified majority, a European law or framework law laying down these 
measures, provided that they are necessary for the functioning of the internal market and to avoid 
distortion of competition. That law or framework law shall be adopted after consultation of the 
European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee. 
Article III-64 (article 94 TEC, changed) 
Without prejudice to Article III-65, a European framework law of the Council of Ministers shall 
establish measures for the approximation of such laws, regulations or administrative provisions of 
the Member States as directly affect the establishment or functioning of the internal market. The 
Council of Ministers shall act unanimously after consulting the European Parliament and the 
Economic and Social Committee. 
Article III-65 (article 95 TEC, changed) 
1. Save where otherwise provided in the Constitution, this Article shall apply for the achievement 
of the objectives set out in Article III-14. European laws or framework laws shall establish 
measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative 
action in Member States which have as their object the establishment and functioning of the 
internal market. Such laws shall be adopted after consultation of the Economic and Social 
Committee. 
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to fiscal provisions, to those relating to the free movement of persons 
or to those relating to the rights and interests of employed persons. 
3. The Commission, in its proposals submitted under paragraph 1 concerning health, safety, 
environmental protection and consumer protection, will take as a base a high level of protection, 
taking account in particular of any new development based on scientific facts. Within their 
respective powers, the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers will also seek to achieve 
this objective. 
4. If, after the adoption of a harmonisation measure by means of a European law, framework law or 
regulation of the Commission, a Member State deems it necessary to maintain national provisions 
on grounds of major needs referred to in Article III-43, or relating to the protection of the 
environment or the working environment, it shall notify the Commission of these provisions as well 
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as the grounds for maintaining them. 
5. Moreover, without prejudice to paragraph 4, if, after the adoption of a harmonisation measure by 
means of a European law, framework law or regulation of the Commission, a Member State deems 
it necessary to introduce national provisions based on new scientific evidence relating to the 
protection of the environment or the working environment on grounds of a problem specific to that 
Member State arising after the adoption of the harmonisation measure, it shall notify the 
Commission of the envisaged provisions and the reasons for them. 
6. The Commission shall, within six months of the notifications referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5, 
adopt a European decision approving or rejecting the national provisions involved after having 
verified whether or not they are a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on 
trade between Member States and whether or not they constitute an obstacle to the functioning of 
the internal market. 
In the absence of a decision by the Commission within this period the national provisions 
referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5 shall be deemed to have been approved. 
When justified by the complexity of the matter and in the absence of danger for human health, the 
Commission may notify the Member State concerned that the period referred to in this paragraph 
may be extended for a further period of up to six months. 
7. When, pursuant to paragraph 6, a Member State is authorised to maintain or introduce national 
provisions derogating from a harmonisation measure, the Commission shall immediately examine 
whether to propose an adaptation to that measure. 
8. When a Member State raises a specific problem on public health in a field which has been the 
subject of prior harmonisation measures, it shall bring it to the attention of the Commission which 
shall immediately examine whether to propose appropriate measures. 
9. By way of derogation from the procedure laid down in Articles III-265 and III-266, the 
Commission and any Member State may bring the matter directly before the Court of Justice if it 
considers that another Member State is making improper use of the powers provided for in this 
Article. 
10. The harmonisation measures referred to in this Article shall, in appropriate cases, include a 
safeguard clause authorising the Member States to take, for one or more of the non-economic 
reasons referred to in Article III-43, provisional steps subject to a Union control procedure. 
 
 
